BEIRUT: As a result of increased security threats following the July-August 2006 war, the Nahr al-Bared events, and security incidents since 2005, Lebanon’s defense and security spending is expected to increase by 22 percent to reach LL2,202 billion or $1.47 billion in 2009. However, with a forecasted 42 percent increase in total expenditures to LL16,304 billion in 2009, defense spending is expected to drop from 15.7 percent of government spending in 2008 to 13.5 percent in 2009.
According to Sweden-based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Lebanon’s defense spending has grown slowly over the past decade. SIPRI estimates that military expenditure in Lebanon rose 24.5 percent between 1999 and 2008, with the bulk of the increase coming in the aftermath of the July-August 2006 war and showing up in the 2007 budget.
Despite the slow growth in defense spending, the latest figures from 2008 showed defense spending constituting 5.1 percent of Lebanon’s GDP, putting the country in a tie with Yemen for fifth place globally in terms of military burden.
Lebanon has five bodies in charge of defense, security and border protection; the Lebanese Army (LA), the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the General Security Forces (GSF), the State Security Forces (SSF), and Customs.
According to the Budget Proposal Report 2009 published by the Finance Ministry, the Lebanese Army’s budget allocation will increase by 20 percent or LL222 billion to reach LL1,358 billion, constituting 8.3 percent of total expenditures.
Speaking to RPN, retired General Elias Hanna described the military budget as “very standard, serving the wait-and-see environment.”
Commenting on the effectiveness of the budget in promoting security and stability in the country, he said that “the defense appropriation is only a fraction of the government’s total budget and includes wages, salaries and maintenance, not nearly enough to reform the Lebanese Army.”
But the relatively small budget does not indicate a lack of interest in developing the army, according to Hanna.
“Even if the army was given the financial resources, you still need to find someone to sell it the weapons, which is another major problem,” he explained.
“In addition, you can’t expect to see a bigger budget for the Lebanese Army when the state is not capable of providing reliable electricity or healthcare, and when the budget deficit continues to grow,” said the retired general.
Indeed, the increase in the military’s budget does not seem to reflect any stepped up government effort to strengthen the Lebanese Army.
Almost 64 percent or LL142 billion of the projected rise in the army’s budget are a result of the increase in salaries and wages following the 66 percent increase in the country’s minimum wage.
Another LL46 billion will go to additional social allowances while an extra LL25 billion are allocated to the increase in materials and supplies, mainly food, fuel, and medicine.
A category called “Current Expenditures” takes up an extra LL1 billion to finance what the ministry describes as “secret expenses.”
Besides spending on current operating activities, the ministry set aside LL61 billion for the army’s capital expenditures, an increase of LL7 billion over the 2008 budget, mainly to purchase additional specialized and technical equipment.
Although the amount spent on acquiring new equipment and ammunitions may appear absurdly out of line with the military needs of the country, it is still not surprising.
Explaining the minimal allocation to the upgrade of the army’s military capabilities, Hanna said that “the Lebanese Army indeed purchases very little of its own weapons and ammunitions, as it receives the bulk of them through donations from abroad.”
“For example, the US has already committed around $800-$900 million in military aid to Lebanon in the form of trucks, light weapons, and other forms,” he explained.
Since the 2006 war, the US has stepped up its military assistance to Lebanon. Total aid since 2006 has exceeded $400 million including vehicles, artillery, light weapons, aerial drones, ammunition, and tanks.
When asked about the risks associated with the dependence on foreign donations to build up the capabilities of the Lebanese Army, Hanna said that “there is no problem in receiving military aid from foreign countries mainly because we have absolutely no other alternative.”
The problem, according to Hanna, does not lie in the army’s dependence on foreign donations, but in the more important question of defense strategy.
“You can’t just acquire weapons without a strategy,” he said. “If your strategy is to fight like Hizbullah, then why would you need the tanks? This is a budget for a missing military strategy,” he explained.
Spending on the remaining security agencies to a large extent resembled the allocation of funds at the Lebanese Army.
Spending on the ISF, the second largest defense body, is forecasted to reach LL641 billion by the end of 2009, an increase of 27 percent compared to 2008, but a decline from 4.4 percent of total spending in 2008 to 23.9 percent.
The bulk of the LL137 billion increase in the ISF budget can be attributed to the increase in minimum wages, costing LL76 billion, and the recruitment of 3,000 trained elements at a cost of LL39 billion.
An additional LL13 billion will go to the purchase of materials and supplies, while LL11 billion will be funneled to increased social allowances. Spending on new equipment will also rise by LL9 billion, reaching LL42 billion, to finance the purchase of new technical, transportation, and IT equipment.
The spending structure at the ISF is very similar to those at the GSF, SSF, and Customs where budgets are seen growing by 25 percent, 25 percent, and 30 percent respectively. Rises in wages and salaries as well as increased spending on social allowances, materials, and supplies make up the bulk of the increased funding for the three bodies.
Altogether, the defense and security budget for 2009 looked like a hefty paycheck, reflecting the overall budget’s missing vision and reforms.
However, the country’s security remains the primary judge of the success or failure of any defense plan. According to Hanna, security conditions do not reflect well for policymakers.
He said that “the current security situation is fragile, but steady because it is no one’s interest to promote instability. However, as soon as that equation changes, the security situation could spiral out of control.”
